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Abstract 
The Development Cooperation Charter of Japan, which took over the ODA (Official 
Development Assistance) Charter in February 2015, drives Japan’s cooperation towards 
non-poor countries and non-poverty issues. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
put Japan forward in these directions. As a result, in Japan the focus on  global poverty 
reduction is overshadowed by its national interests and sustainability under the concept of 
universality, which was a core principle of the SDGs as differentiated from the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
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author represented Japan and three other delegates represented China, Korea and Russia. The views 
expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the official positions of either 
author’s affiliation or JASID. 
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1. Introduction 
 The year 2015 will be remembered as a critical point relative to Japan’s stance towards 
international cooperation. In February the Cabinet approved Japan’s new Development Cooperation 
Charter, which replaced the ODA (Official Development Assistance) Charter. The concept of 
“Development Cooperation” is supposed to cover a wider domain of cooperation than that put into 
the “ODA”. A symbolic difference between the two concepts is that while the ODA highlights 
assistance to low income countries the scope of Development Cooperation explicitly includes middle 
and high income countries. There are other differences that are detailed in next section. 
 In September 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNGA 
2015). As discussed in Section 3, the principle of universality incorporated into the SDGs also 
dilutes the poverty-focus among the seventeen goals. This attenuation of focus of the SDGs on 
poverty reduction reflects the switch from the ODA Charter to the Development Cooperation Charter 
of Japan. Thus, two transformations, i.e., one from MDGs to SDGs and the other from the ODA 
Charter to the Development Cooperation Charter, go hand in hand towards a relative distraction from 
poverty reduction in low income countries for Japan. The former transformation makes sustainability 
overshadow poverty reduction, while the latter transformation further weakens the attention to 
poverty in Japan. As shown in Section 3, the government of Japan advocated the principle of 
universality, which made the government of Japan act for the benefits of the Japanese nationals 
under the name of international cooperation. This is the main point this author will argue in this 
article. 
 The above argument is formulated by analyses of published information and resources 
given to the author when he served for the government of Japan as an external expert. The rest of 
this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 the contents of Japan’s new Development 
Cooperation Charter are described. There are some distinctive features that were not included in the 
previous ODA Charter and are newly introduced into the Development Cooperation Charter. In 
Section 3 how Japan participated in the formation of the SDGs is discussed. After elaborating the 
open discussion process known as the Open Working Group, which was prepared for all national 
governments in 2014, an ad hoc consultation meeting conducted by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) for East Asian experts in March 2012 is introduced. A delegate representing the 
government of Japan presented the skeleton of Japan’s proposal for post 2015 global goals, which 
indicated Japan’s attitude on its post 2015 agenda. At the meeting a key principle of SDGs, namely 
universality, was advocated by Japan’s delegate and most of the other East Asian participants. The 
final section concludes this article. 
 
5 
2. Establishment of Japan’s Development Cooperation Charter 
 
2.1. From ODA Charter to Development Cooperation Charter 
 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been the ruling party in Japan for most of the 
time since the end of World War II. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led the 
government from 2009 through 2012. In June 2010 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
published a guiding principle toward international cooperation under the DPJ’s administration in a 
report entitled “Enhancing Enlightened National Interest” (MOFA 2010). The title of the report 
shows that the DPJ-led government attempted to reconcile national interests and an openness of the 
Japanese society for global enlightenment. 
 In December 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came back to power after a 
general election. The attitude of the refreshed LDP-led government on incorporation of national 
interests into international cooperation was similar to that of the DPJ-led government. The most 
straightforward manifestation lies in the “Development Cooperation Charter”, which was approved 
by the cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in February 2015. This charter renewed Japan’s stance 
for international cooperation, and superseded the “ODA Charter”, which was first stipulated in 1992 
and revised in 2003. It is notable that the term “national interests”, which did not appear in the ODA 
Charter, was introduced in the new charter.
1
 
 The swap of “Development Cooperation” for “ODA” in the two charters coincides with a 
proposed switch of “Aid Effectiveness” for “Development Effectiveness” in the principle of 
OECD/DAC donors, which was presented by a tripartite research group
2
 of Japan, Republic of 
Korea and the United States at the Fourth High Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, 
Korea, in 2011 (Kharas, Makino and Jung 2011, p. 30). While “Aid Effectiveness” has been a 
concept of effectiveness of the ODA to achieve goals on international development, the new concept 
of “Development Effectiveness” is for examining effectiveness of all possible resources, not only 
ODA but also private firms, philanthropists, civil society and so on, towards development. Thus, 
Development Effectiveness is a convenient substitute for Aid Effectiveness, which reduces burdens 
on OECD donors. In the switch from Aid Effectiveness to Development Effectiveness, the Japan 
                                                   
1
 Objectives referred to in Section 1 “Basic Philosophy” of 1992 ODA Charter were poverty, 
humanity, freedom, human rights, democracy, peace, prosperity, environmental conservation, good 
governance, basic human needs and friendly relations between Japan and all other countries. 
Meanwhile, the objectives of Japan’s ODA appearing in Section 1 “Philosophy: Objectives, Policies, 
and Priorities” of 2003 ODA Charter are described as “to contribute to the peace and development of 
the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity.” 
Needless to say, the latter objectives contain national interests of the Japanese as indirect 
consequences from Japan’s contribution to the peace and development of the international 
community. 
2
 The three institutions are Brookings Institution, JICA Research Institute and Korea International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA). 
6 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) played a leading role on behalf of the government of Japan, 
as noted by Kharas, Makino and Jung (2011). 
 The new Development Cooperation Charter of Japan also shares the same orientation with 
the concept of Development Effectiveness in the sense that the new charter is also directed towards 
the alleviation of the burden on the central government. Another conspicuous feature of the charter is 
expansion of coverage of the charter’s goals beyond poverty reduction.  
 The features of the new charter are summarized by MOFA in a four page “outline” of the 
Development Cooperation Charter posted at MOFA’s web site (MOFA 2015). According to the 
outline the main points of the new charter are four-fold: 1) Philosophy of Japan’s Development 
Cooperation [Non-military cooperation; and human security among others], 2) Development 
Cooperation in a New Era [inclusive and sustainable growth; and ODA to (possibly medium and 
high income) countries with special vulnerabilities, among others], 3) Development Cooperation as 
Catalyst
3
 [Partnership with private sectors, Japanese local governments and Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) / Civil Society Organization (CSO)], and 4) Participation of Diverse Actors in 
Development [Promotion of participation of women and other vulnerable groups of people]. 
 
2.2. Features of the New Charter 
 Replacement of the ODA Charter with the Development Cooperation Charter augments 
both the contributors and the recipients of Japan’s cooperation. Figure 1 summarizes the changes in 
the domain of the ODA and the “development cooperation” that were incorporated into the 
Development Cooperation Charter. These changes are shown on the horizontal and vertical axes. 
Augmentation of the “affiliated agencies” is described as the diversification of contributors on the 
horizontal dimension. In the new charter the “affiliated agency” is counted as a contributor of 
development cooperation. The vertical dimension of Figure 1 exhibits a variety of recipients of 
Japan’s development cooperation. In addition to developing countries, middle / high income 
countries and Japanese private firms are added as eligible recipients of development cooperation if 
certain conditions are met. In Subsection 2.2.1, the involvement of Japan’s private sector into 
development cooperation is elaborated, while Subsection 2.2.2 discusses the diversification of 
recipients. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
3
 Note that the word of “catalyze” was used in the title of the Brookings Institution-JICA-KOICA 
book (Kharas, Makino and Jung 2011). This implies that the new charter was well coordinated with 
this book, which was published right before the Busan High Level Forum. 
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Figure 1. Domain of “Development Cooperation” 
 
Contributors 
Government of Japan 
Private Sector / Local 
Government / NGO 
Recipients 
Developing Countries ODA      
Middle / High Income 
Countries 
Development Cooperation 
 
Japanese companies 
Note: The set of cells encircled by the broken line is the domain of development cooperation; the 
ODA limited the contribution of the central government of Japan to central governments of 
developing countries. 
 
2.2.1. Burden Sharing to “Affiliated Agencies” 
 The review of the ODA Charter was announced by Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, in March 2014. In the same month the review committee for the ODA Charter was 
formulated and its first meeting was held on March 31, 2014. When the first meeting was held, not 
only its opening but also its prospective conclusions were widely broadcast by TV stations and 
newspapers in Japan at the same time, even though the review was yet to start. The indicated main 
focuses of “conclusions” were: i) proactive contribution to the peace, and ii) public-private 
partnership. In other words, the review committee’s discussion did not start from scratch, and the 
directions of review were determined beforehand. 
 The point to be highlighted and explored deeply in this article is related to the second 
focus, i.e., the public-private partnership. More broadly, the direction of burden sharing in 
development efforts requested by the central government of Japan to all other parties including 
private sectors is a comprehensive feature of the new charter. It is stated in the charter that the 
government of Japan becomes a “catalyst” rather than a main driving force (Cabinet 2015). This 
direction is spelled out in the preamble of the new charter as: 
 
‘(T)he term "development cooperation" refers to "international cooperation activities that are 
conducted by the government and its affiliated agencies for the main purpose of development in 
developing regions”’. (Cabinet 2015, preamble) 
 
Thus, the charter covers cooperation activities conducted by not only the central government but also 
“its affiliated agencies”. 
 Several “affiliated agencies” are exemplified in the new charter. The private sector is the 
most frequently cited agency in the charter. To achieve “national interests” by promoting Japanese 
industries through international cooperation, (Japan’s) private sector is a natural counterpart to 
8 
“affiliate” for the central government. An advocating factor of this orientation is the Base of the 
Pyramid (BOP) argument, which claims that business with the lowest stratum of the population in 
terms of income may be profitable as well as poverty reducing (Prahalad 2005). Therefore, the BOP 
argument is used to justify the burden sharing of international cooperation with the private sector. 
JICA established the Office for Private Sector Partnership in 2008, which subsequently was 
expanded as the “Private Sector Partnership and Finance Department”. This department promotes 
mobilization of resources from the private sector (JICA 2010, p. 140). Since the establishment of the 
office JICA has financially supported Japanese firms with the ODA to conduct feasibility studies of 
BOP business under the title of “Preparatory Surveys for BOP Business Promotion” (JICA 2015, p. 
109). 
 The second and third “affiliated agencies” are Japan’s local governments and NGOs/CSOs. 
JICA has had schemes to mobilize the human resources of local governments and NGOs/CSOs for 
years in order to utilize the skills and experiences accumulated into personnel in local governments 
and NGOs/CSOs (JICA 2014, pp. 112-113, among others). A highlight of recent Japan’s 
collaboration with philanthropic organizations is the polio eradication project initiated in 2011 in 
Pakistan together with Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (JICA 2012, p. 9). This project utilizes a 
loan conversion mechanism where in the Gates Foundation repays JICA’s loan on behalf of Pakistan 
if Pakistan achieves performance targets that are set in advance. This result-based project was 
successfully completed in 2014, and the same scheme was applied to Nigeria (JICA 2015, p. 56). 
 As mentioned before, the main “affiliated agency” with which the government of Japan 
expects collaboration is the Japanese private sector. Collaboration with the Japanese private sector is 
consistent with the newly introduced view point of “national interests” in the sense that an increase 
in ODA funded orders to Japanese firms vitalizes the Japanese economy in the following ways: 1) 
direct monetary flow to Japanese companies; 2) the enhancement of the presence and reputation of 
Japanese firms in developing countries.
4
 
 In the meantime, even long before the term “national interests” was written down in the 
Development Cooperation Charter, pursuit of the national interests of the Japanese through contracts 
of ODA projects with Japanese private firms was identified and criticized by scholars and other 
OECD donors. Arase (1995), Ensign (1992) Leheny and Warren (2010, pp. 4-8), and Orr (1990) 
pointed out the tendency of Japan’s ODA to be undertaken by Japanese firms and claimed that the 
Japanese firms were sought out not because of efficiency but favoritism. 
                                                   
4
 This orientation is echoed by “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” which was announced by 
Prime Minister Abe in May 2015. This Partnership is an initiative of the government of Japan in 
collaboration with the Asian Development Bank to commit 110 billion US dollar for high quality 
infrastructure investment in Asia for five years (MOFA, MOF, METI and MLIT 2015). This 
partnership covers infrastructure investments that are not financed by ODA. Emergence of China 
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was inaugurated in January 2016 as influential 
donors in Asia are considered to motivate Japan’s policy changes reflected by the partnership. 
9 
 A symbolic institutional setting associated Japan’s ODA and Japanese companies is a “tied 
project”, which requires that its main contractors are Japanese firms. This “tying” issue has been 
long regarded as a key problem to Japan internationalizing its government procurement procedures 
and making them more open to outsiders. Specifically, the ratio of untied aid to total ODA has been 
carefully examined by OECD/DAC. The 1996 report on an OECD peer review indicated that the 
ratio increased from 28 percent in 1972 to 84 percent in 1993 (OECD/DAC 1996a, p. 37). As far as 
ODA loans were concerned, the untied ratio reached almost 100 percent up to the end of the 1990s
5
 
(OECD/DAC 1999, pp. 61-62). OECD/DAC was pleased that Japan became “one of the most 
prominent and vocal advocates of untied aid” (OECD/DAC 1999, p. 19). 
 Thus, close ties between Japan’s ODA and its business sector were heavily imprinted in 
OECD members’ minds, and a detachment of the Japanese business sector from Japan’s ODA has 
been a main challenge for Japan to convince other OECD members that Japan is as good a donor as 
others. Previously, Japan made good progress in wiping out “tied aid” behavior. Now, however, the 
term “national interests” is explicitly installed, which reminds one of the hardly disentangled ties 
between ODA and business in Japan. Moreover, a new device to fasten the ties, which is named 
“Special Terms for Economic Partnership (STEP)” was invented in 2002 and has been applied 
mainly to infrastructure building
6
. STEP is a scheme of tied loans for “raising the visibility of 
Japanese ODA among citizens in both recipient countries and Japan through best use of advanced 
technologies and know-how of Japanese firms” (cited by a JICA’s web site concerning STEP
7
). 
 Taking all of this into account, Japan appears to be regressing to how it was when it was an 
emerging donor in the 1960s-70s. Therefore, the public-private partnership introduced in the 
Development Cooperation Charter does not sound new to observers of Japan’s aid. 
 
2.2.2. Japan’s shifts towards non-poor countries and non-poverty issues 
 In the previous subsection, expansion of the coverage of the new Development 
Cooperation Charter in terms of contributors was discussed. Specifically, the domain of development 
cooperation was enlarged by inputs. It is notable that the domain is extended in terms of outcomes as 
well, which is the main issue elaborated in this subsection.
8
 
                                                   
5
 Japan’s grants are more likely to be tied, while technical cooperation is almost solely conducted by 
the Japanese experts (OECD/DAC 1996a, pp. 37-38). Carol Lancaster posed a concern that even 
untied projects might be consigned to Japanese subsidiary companies registered in aid recipient 
countries (Lancaster 2010, pp. 39-40). 
6
 JICA (2013) was published as the latest update of the special terms. 
7
 Its URL is http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/oda_loans/step/index.html. 
8 Expanding the domain of cooperation helps inflate the amount of Japan’s ODA. Japan faces 
difficulties to raise its ratio of ODA to Gross National Income (GNI) to the target of 0.70 percent 
which was agreed at OECD/DAC. Japan’s ODA-GNI ratio in 2013 was 0.23. To close the gap 
between 0.70 and 0.23, the inflation of international cooperation in terms of inputs and outputs, 
which is indicated in Figure 1, may help. 
10 
 First, “proactive contribution to the peace” is incorporated into the philosophy of the new 
charter (Cabinet 2015). The contribution is limited to “non-military purposes”. However, this is a 
drastic policy change from the viewpoint of Japan’s security policy. Inclusion of security-related 
cooperation into the concept of “development cooperation” is also new. 
 Second, development cooperation covers assistance to not only developing countries but 
also middle and high income countries. The following sentences in the charter spell out the wider 
coverage of countries to be assisted under the new charter: 
 
‘Japan will extend necessary cooperation to countries based on their actual development needs 
and affordability. These include countries that despite progress in development, are laden with 
challenges that hamper sustained economic growth, notably the so-called "middle income 
trap," as well as with development challenges including global challenges such as exposure to 
natural disasters, infectious diseases, and environmental issues and climate change; small 
island countries and others that are faced with special vulnerabilities despite having attained a 
certain level of per capita income.’ (Subsection II (2) Priority policy issues by region of the 
Development Cooperation Charter) 
 
Now, “despite having attained a certain level of per capita income”, Japan’s cooperation may be 
granted to middle and high income countries. Thus, substantially developed countries may receive 
“development cooperation” from Japan. 
 This diversion of the domain of “development cooperation” is combined with the emphasis 
on the national interests of Japan. A plausible consequence of this combination is an increase in 
assistance to non-poor countries for non-development purposes. The “development cooperation” 
defined in the new Development Cooperation Charter is expanded beyond the concept of 
“development” that has been maintained by the international community
9
. 
 Lastly, Japanese companies, in particular small and medium enterprises (SMEs), are 
counted as partners of the central government for development cooperation (Cabinet 2015). As a 
result Japanese SMEs have been treated as recipients of Japan’s ODA more openly. Even before the 
new charter was established, ODA has been granted to Japanese companies as long as the activities 
of the Japanese companies are conducive to international development, for example in the context of 
BOP business promotion. Upon the replacement of the ODA Charter with the Development 
Cooperation Charter, this portion of ODA, which is delivered to Japan’s SMEs, is highlighted more 
in newspapers and broadcasting. 
                                                   
9
 For example, a relevant goal from the view point of “development” of the United Nations is 
incorporated into Preamble of the UN Charter is written as “to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom”. 
11 
 As a result, expected recipients of development cooperation under the new charter are 
expanded as described in the vertical axis of Figure 1. In addition to developing countries, “ODA 
graduated countries” are also covered as recipients of development cooperation if they have “special 
vulnerabilities”. Examples of the “special vulnerabilities” are the middle income trap and climate 
change. On top of that, Japanese private firms became entitled to be recipients of development 
cooperation if their business activities are considered to contribute to international development. In 
conclusion, the domain of development cooperation is enlarged in terms of both contributors (agents 
for inputs) and recipients (agents for outcomes). 
 
 
3. Sustainable Development Goals and Japan 
 
3.1. Formation of SDGs 
 Millennium Development Goals, which have been a focus of international cooperation of 
the world since the beginning of this millennium, were taken over by the Sustainable Development 
Goals according to the resolution adopted at the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 
2015 (UNGA 2015). The SDGs consist of seventeen goals that are classified into the following five 
categories: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership. The seventeen goals are briefly 
summarized by the United Nations as follows: (1) No poverty; (2) Zero hunger; (3) Good health and 
well-being; (4) Quality education; (5) Gender equality; (6) Clean water and sanitation; (7) 
Affordable and clean energy; (8) Decent work and economic growth; (9) Industry, innovation and 
infrastructure; (10) Reduced inequality; (11) Sustainable cities and communities; (12) Responsible 
consumption and production; (13) Climate action; (14) Life below water; (15) Life on land; (16) 
Peace, justice and strong institutions; and (17) Partnerships for the goals. 
 There was criticism of the process of formation of the MDGs; it was claimed that the 
formation procedure was not open and transparent, particularly to people in the developing world
10
. 
The origin of the MDGs was the International Development Goals (IDGs) proposed by the 
OECD/DAC in 1996 (OECD/DAC 1996b, pp. 8-11). The basic structure of the IDGs was followed 
by the MDGs. Therefore, examination of the MDGs was undertaken by high officials of developed 
countries; however, people in developing countries did not have any opportunities to participate in 
the formation process. 
 Addressing this weakness, the formulation of the post MDGs framework was designed to 
give opportunities to everyone in the world to respond. Around 2011 discussion on the post 2015 
framework became active. However, as early as June 2012, the basic concept of the new goals was 
                                                   
10
 This weakness was admitted by the United Nations. See Unite Nations System Task Team on the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda (2012), pp. 46-47. 
12 
determined as “Sustainable Development Goals” at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development, which is known as Rio+20. Three levels of consultation were conducted after Rio+20. 
The three levels are (1) eminent persons, (2) general public and (3) business sector. The high-level 
consultation was assigned to the “High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda” which was co-chaired by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, 
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, and Prime Minister David Cameron of the United 
Kingdom, in July 2012. The report of the panel was released in May 2013 (High Level Panel on the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda 2013). The consultation for the general public was done through an 
online platform named “The World We Want”, and in face-to-face consultations taking place in 
various countries including developing nations. Consultations with the business sector were made 
through the United Nations Global Compact with which thousands of companies and organizations 
are affiliated from all over the world. 
 Finalization of the goals and targets of the SDGs was made by the “Open Working Group 
Meeting on Sustainable Development Goals” (OWG-SDGs, hereafter), which was an 
intergovernmental meeting among United Nations’ member and observer states. The OWG-SDGs 
was endorsed by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 2012). The first 
session of the OWG-SDGs was held in May 2013, and thirteen sessions were organized by July 
2014.
11
 Its outcome document was released in August 2014 (OWG-SDGs 2014b). The OWG-SDGs 
adopted a unique consensus-building method in that member countries were encouraged to form a 
group of nations composed of one to four countries voluntarily, and each group of nations was 
supposed to submit proposals on goals and targets of the SDGs to the OWG-SDGs. In the end thirty 
groups were formulated. Japan formed a group with Iran and Nepal. 
 All proposals submitted by the thirty groups and some other eligible participants up to the 
10th session of OWG-SDGs (31 March - 4 April 2014) are compiled in a report entitled 
Encyclopedia Groupinica (OWG-SDGs 2014a). Those proposals were narrowed down into the final 
report of the OWG-SDGs, which was released right before a United Nations General Assembly 
session taking place in September 2014 (OWG-SDGs 2014b). The seventeen goals proposed in the 
OWG-SDGs (2014b) were adopted exactly and were the same as those of the final version of the 
SDGs, while expressions of some of the 169 targets were revised. Thus, the OWG-SDGs (2014b) 
can be taken as the “almost final” version of the SDGs.  
 
3.2. Japan’s Approaches to the Formation of SDGs 
 
3.2.1. Japan’s Inputs to Open Working Group 
                                                   
11
 In addition to officers of MOFA, those from JICA were also mobilized in Japan’s team 
participating in OWG-SDGs. 
13 
 The OWG-SDGs was the final and transparent opportunity for national governments to put 
views and opinions into the SDGs. As a matter of fact, the number of “focus areas” in Encyclopedia 
Groupinica, which were narrowed down to the “goals” of the SDGs were nineteen in number rather 
than seventeen. The number of proposed targets was around 2000, which were refined to 169 in the 
end. Thus, most countries took the OWG-SDGs as the final and important opportunity to affect the 
substance of the SDGs. 
 However, Japan proposed only three draft targets (OWG-SDGs 2014a). This contribution 
was extremely small in comparison to the total number (around 2000) of draft targets. In the end, the 
Iran / Japan / Nepal group did not submit any joint proposals of targets. Apart from that group, Iran 
proposed thirteen targets. Nepal did not propose any targets by itself. However, Nepal belongs to 
Group of 77
12
 and Least Developed Countries, and these groups collectively submitted many 
proposals. 
 Thus, Japan’s explicit and open contribution to the draft SDGs looks very limited and all 
three targets submitted by Japan were related to universal health coverage
13
. 
 
3.2.2. Post 2015 to be Development Focused or Universal? 
 Needless to say, the OWG-SDGs was not the only device available for understanding the 
views of national governments. As mentioned above, MDGs’ replacement by SDGs had already 
been determined at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 
2012. Consultations by the UNDP on Post-2015 global goals were conducted even before Rio+20. 
 One of such consultation meeting was undertaken by the UNDP in March 2012 in Japan 
where East Asian experts including ex-ministers were invited. Though the title of the meeting was 
the “East Asian Regional Consultation on the Human Development Reports and Measurement of 
Progress”, a focal issue was on how the post-2015 global goals should take shape (UNDP 2012). 
This author also participated in this meeting. 
 A critical question raised by the UNDP was whether the new goals should be 
“development-focused” as the MDGs were, or “universal”. According to the UNDP (2012), some 
stakeholders saw the MDGs as being less “universal”, and that the new goals should satisfy 
“universality”. 
 The concept of universality implies that the new goals should be for the sake of everybody 
on the globe, while the MDGs were for the sake of only the poor people in the world. It is notable 
that Goal 8 of the MDGs “Develop a global partnership for development” was assumed to be mainly 
pursued by developed countries. Therefore, borrowing Abraham Lincoln’s statement, MDGs were 
                                                   
12
 Group of 77 was established among developing countries in 1964 to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
13
 Japan advocates universal health coverage. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe contributed twice to The 
Lancet, a reputed medical journal, to promote this concept (Abe 2013, 2015). 
14 
pursued “for the poor people by all (poor and rich) people”. People advocating universality 
requested new goals to be “for all people by all people”. 
 There is a concern that the principle of universality weakens the “development-focus” in 
the SDGs. UNEP and OHCHR (2015), which was written to advocate the principle of universality, 
admits there are people who “have expressed a concern that universality could potentially undermine 
the focus on the poorest”. 
 The question of whether the new goals should be universal or development-focused was 
posed at the above-mentioned East Asian regional consultation meeting organized by the UNDP in 
March 2012. The dominating views expressed at the meeting were affirmative for universality. This 
response is understandable, taking into account the fact that most of the East Asian countries made 
good progress in poverty reduction and that many of them had become middle income countries. 
 A delegate from the government of Japan to the meeting, who also agreed with the 
universality principle, presented Japan’s proposal of post 2015 global goals. It was entitled “Pact for 
Global Well-being”. Not only environmental sustainability but also disaster risk management, 
economic growth and equity were incorporated into the concept of “well-being”. Human security, 
which has been a central feature of Japan’s international cooperation since the then Prime Minister 
Keizo Obuchi used this term in his speech and established “Trust Fund for Human Security” for the 
United Nations in December 1998
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, was embedded in the proposal. Food security, special 
treatments for fragile states, green growth, inclusive growth, shared growth, knowledge-based 
growth, employment, and infrastructure were proposed as parts of key concepts. 
 There are interesting proximities and differences between Japan’s proposal and the final 
form of the SDGs. The most visible difference is the overarching concept of new global goals, 
namely sustainable development and well-being. It is impressive that the delegate of Japan proposed 
the concept of well-being for the new global goals just three months before the goal was finalized as 
the SDGs in June 2012 at Rio+20. It is probable that the delegate of Japan was not informed that the 
UN’s discussion inclined towards sustainable development. In the meantime, there are many items in 
common between Japan’s proposal and the SDGs. Sustainability set aside, equity, economic growth, 
employment and even infrastructure and energy were taken up in some goals of the SDGs. Disaster 
risk management is incorporated in some targets under some goals, too. Thus, parts of Japan’s 
intentions on post 2015 global goals were reflected by the final version of the SDGs. 
 Above all, it is noticeable that the feature of universality is in common between Japan’s 
proposal and the SDGs. It is clear that the intention of Japan is that the new global goals are for the 
sake of a part of the Japanese, which was not fulfilled by the MDGs. 
 
                                                   
14
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has a web site which summarizes activities of Japan on 
human security: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/chronology.html. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
 The concept of universality underlying the SDGs is defended by its interpretation as “no 
one left behind”. The Japanese interpret this as even the Japanese are not left behind. As a result, the 
SDGs are the latest and greatest global goals endorsed by the government of Japan to pursue the 
welfare of the Japanese. This endorsement by the external factor was harmonious with the explicit 
introduction of national interests into Japan’s Development Cooperation Charter. 
 It is common that Japan’s foreign policy is analyzed by momenta stemming internally and 
externally (Lancaster 2010 among others). There are terms in Japanese standing for the internal and 
foreign pressures, which are naiatsu and gaiatsu, respectively. A typical gaiatsu comes from the 
United States, which intends to use Japan’s international cooperation as a complement to US foreign 
policy (Lancaster 2010). As for replacement of the ODA Charter with the Development Cooperation 
Charter, a gaiatsu (an external factor), which is the establishment of the SDGs at this time, went in 
unison with a naiatsu, the pursuit of national interests. 
 The Millennium Development Goals were a raison d’etre for Japan to contribute to 
poverty reduction in the world. Replacing MDGs, the SDGs let Japan design a more self-oriented 
international cooperation policy. The new Development Cooperation Charter has a wider scope 
designed to serve non-poor countries and address non-poverty issues by incorporating profit seeking 
actors. The motivation of national interests is openly spelled out in the new charter. In the shadow of 
rising tides of sustainability and public-private partnership, the prior orientation towards poverty 
reduction is diluted. Japan’s drive towards national interests is facilitated by the SDGs’ principle of 
universality, which looks seemingly non-controversial under the slogan “no one left behind”. The 
problem is that this slogan covers up the dilution of focus on poverty reduction with the SDGs and 
makes it difficult for global citizens to notice the common orientation of the SDGs and Japan’s 
Development Cooperation Charter, which newly and openly publicizes Japan’s pursuit of national 
interests through “development cooperation”. 
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